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Abstract 
 
In 1854, Admiral FitzRoy, acting as the first head of the Meteorological Department, 
initiated a project to distribute fishery barometers to poor fishing communities to help 
them predict poor weather. At roughly the same time, FitzRoy developed a 
controversial system of telegraphing weather forecasts to coastal towns to warn them 
of impending storms, the first of its kind in Britain. This episode serves as a case study 
in the role of tacit and formal knowledge in risk management and the construction of 
responsible users of scientific information. Rather than contributing to formal risk 
management in the new government office, the fishery barometers distributed by 
FitzRoy and the Meteorological Department were explicitly excluded from the wider 
project to map British and global weather. But by being excluded from the formal 
system, these barometers and their fishermen users were in fact able to contribute to 
the overall safety of the national system of meteorology. This study reveals that 
autonomous individuals can augment formalized risk management systems by 
remaining separate from them in key respects.  
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Introduction 
 
Most Victorian fishermen were illiterate. When writing to request a fishery 
barometer from the newly established Meteorological (hereafter Met) Department, 
the men of Britain’s poorest communities relied on a local gentleman to draft and 
write the letter for them and many signed their names only with a simple mark. 
However, when these letters were received at the government office in Whitehall, 
they were submitted to an efficient system of review and annotation. In the standard 
manner, Admiral Robert FitzRoy, the newly appointed head of the office, noted on 
the back of the letter that the request should be acknowledged and, usually, an 
instrument supplied. Next to his notes the secretary duly recorded the date at which 
a barometer would be sent.  
 
Petitions such as these represent a rare point of contact between a group of poor and 
uneducated fishermen, largely unable to write, and the new government office, 
which was obsessed with written records of its own business and of the weather. 
The fulcrum between these two worlds was the fishery barometer, an instrument 
that both FitzRoy and the fishermen believed could contribute to the safety of men 
at sea. Roughly two feet high, the barometer featured a large, easy-to-read display 
plate and a sturdy construction that would suit it to a life of public exposure on the 
roughest parts of Britain’s coasts. By faithfully observing the rise and fall of the 
barometer, local fishermen would be able to predict storms that might have 
otherwise taken them by surprise, keeping them safe in harbour when the worst of 
the weather hit. In the mid-19th century, fishermen wrote to the central government 
office because they too believed that the government instruments could help keep 
them safe. 
 
The relationship between safety and registration, which includes both the obsessive 
pursuit of registrations in the name of safety as well as their deliberate 
discouragement or mere absence, forms the core of this paper. This relationship is 
assessed through an investigation of both the cause and the surprising effect of the 
unlikely contact between a world of intense registration—that of mid-Victorian 
bureaucracy—and one of tacit or informal knowledge—that of mid-Victorian 
fishermen. The cause is the barometer itself, a product of the Meteorological 
Department, a specialized central scientific office. The surprising effect is that the 
subsequent contact between a system of bureaucratic control (not to say discipline) 
and a group of impoverished individuals who were quite literally the captains of 
their own ships did not result in the subordination of the latter to the former. 
Instead, as the remainder of this paper will demonstrate, the formal bureaucratic 
system came to rely on the informal one in important respects. Furthermore, this 
reliance was understood to further the safety of British fishermen and mariners and, 
perhaps even more significantly, the safety of the new government Meteorological 
Department itself.  
 
Put another way, this paper seeks to address a basic question relevant to risk studies 
more generally: what is the relationship between tacit knowledge (which by 
definition cannot be communicated through writing) and formal risk management 
practices (which are by definition based on written rules)? It is clear that there is 
often a significant gap between how risks are identified and planned for in formal 
risk assessment and managements systems and what happens in practice when 
adverse events, be they accidents, disasters or financial crashes, actually occur. 
Both sides of this gap have been investigated in the extensive risk literature, and 
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there are rich studies of both risk management in action and formal risk 
management systems. What has proved more difficult to analyse are the ways in 
which formal and tacit (also known as informal or practical) approaches can 
actually be seen to interrelate and to connect with one another. Aside from offering 
the intuitively attractive possibility of a more holistic vision of risk, linking these 
as-yet-distinct genres may help eliminate the lingering deficit-model that still taints 
some studies of individual responses to risk while enabling a more realistic vision 
of how individuals, and organizations, actually respond to risk. Acknowledging that 
public knowledge can be, and is, constituted through the contributions of many 
kinds of knowers, which includes people such as fishermen, farmers, and local 
inhabitants as well as scientists, is one way to eliminate the implicit binary (and 
hierarchical) division between expert and lay knowledge that dogs so many public 
and scholarly debates over risk. 
 
On the face of it, the government meteorological office and the fishermen were 
united in their interests. Both were committed to the same thing: the safety of 
sailors at sea. Indeed, the government office had been founded for the very purpose 
of keeping British mariners safe. In 1854, following an international meteorological 
congress held in Brussels, Parliament sanctioned a vote of £3200 to the Board of 
Trade and £1000 for the Admiralty to establish a “uniform system of 
meteorological observations at sea” in order to help determine the “very best tracks 
for ships to follow in order to make the quickest as well as safest passages.” 1  The 
Met Department was established soon afterwards. But while the safety of sailors 
and fishermen (as well as the efficiency of sea voyages) was paramount, the official 
remit of the office was to gather meteorological statistics—registrations of the rise 
and fall of temperature, wind and current speed, and barometric pressure—which 
would eventually, but not immediately, lead to a better understanding of the laws of 
the weather. The bureaucratic and scientific habits of registration joined in the Met 
Department, whose founders believed that the safety of British sailors would be 
achieved only by combining the two in a slow and painstaking process of extensive 
data collection and eventual reduction to universal laws. This process included the 
construction, verification and distribution of standardized meteorological 
instruments as well as the collection of vast amounts of data from ships’ log books. 
It did not include the distribution of expensive instruments to illiterate fishermen 
who were anyway more concerned with the immediate dangers posed by the sea 
than with the necessarily remote science of the weather. 
 
While the Met Department lacked a formal founding directive, the advice of the 
Royal Society and several eminent foreign meteorologists was solicited in early 
1855 and the subsequent correspondence from the Royal Society functioned as a de 
facto charter. 2 This correspondence clearly outlined the aims to which a respectable 
government science office should be directed. Edward Sabine, summarizing the 
conclusions in his capacity as President of the Royal Society, stipulated that the 
                                                 
1Parliament sanctioned a vote of £3200 to the Board of Trade and £1000 for the Admiralty to 
establish a ‘uniform system of meteorological observations at sea’ in order to help determine the 
‘very best tracks for ships to follow in order to make the quickest as well as safest passages.’ Letter 
from James Booth, Committee of Privy Council for Trade, Sept 1854 ‘Report of the Met 
Department for 1857,’ Parliamentary Paper (henceforth PP) 1857 XX, 283-372. These annual grants 
would remain unchanged for the first five years of the office.  
2
 See Public Record Office, National Archives, Kew (henceforth PRO) BJ 7/4 iv for the letter from 
the Earl of Rosse and PRO BJ 7/4 v for replies from five foreign meteorologists: Adolphe Quetelet, 
Matthew Fontaine Maury, Erman (of Berlin), Kreil ( of Durazzo, Albania), and Heis (of Munster, 
Westphalia). 
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new government department should be “an office for the discussion of the 
observations on Meteorology to be made at sea in all parts of the globe” which will 
constitute “an extension to the system of meteorological observations as may cause 
it to include, in addition to the information required for the purpose of navigation, 
such scientific desiderata as may be deemed best calculated for the investigation 
and establishment of great atmospheric and oceanic laws, and may be obtainable by 
observations either on land or on sea.”3 The office would “publish from time to 
time and to circulate such statistical results, obtained by means of the observations 
referred, as might be considered most desirable by men learned in the science of 
Meteorology, in addition to such other information as may be required for the 
purposes of navigation.”4  
 
The emphasis the Royal Society placed on the collection of statistics was consonant 
with their view that the government office would help constitute a new scientific 
discipline. Securing a proper foundation for this newly made discipline was urgent 
for those scientists who saw themselves as spokesmen, not simply for meteorology. 
but for a larger scientific project that would require consistent and generous 
endowment by the government.5 William Whewell’s three-stage model of scientific 
progress provided the template for their ambitions. According to Whewell’s 
schema, preludes marked by patient and extensive data collection eventually gave 
way to inductive epochs in which great men such as Newton and Faraday 
discovered the (preferably mathematical) laws governing the once disordered mass 
of information, to be followed by periods of slower consolidation of the successes 
achieved.6 
 
The fishery barometers, and the illiterate fishermen for whom they were intended, 
were not to be part of this inductive program. The instant judgement that the 
fishermen exercised when reading the barometer had no obvious place in such a 
project. Nevertheless, during the time that FitzRoy was managing the collection of 
data in the early years of the Met Department, he was also superintending a project 
to distribute barometers to poor fishing communities along British coasts. The 
project led to the installation of dozens of expensive barometers in small coastal 
villages, where many of them can still be seen today. 
 
Asked in 1861 by the secretary of the Royal National Lifeboat Institution if he had 
considered the possibility of having fishermen register the rises and falls of the 
barometer on a special chart, FitzRoy replied that the matter: 
had due discussion here, before the first instrument reached its destination. 
Having weighed well the objects of registry, the construction of the ‘Fishery 
Barometer,’ and the qualifications of those persons entrusted with its care, it 
was decided to refrain from asking for any formal registration . . . . The 
register returned from an ordinary Fishery Station might not be required for 
official or scientific objects, because near other, and superior places of 
observation and record; while its character, for a certain time of 
inexperience, might not be so reliable as would be requisite. There must be a 
                                                 
3
 Royal Society letter from Earl of Rosse, June 19,1854, PRO BJ 7/4 iv. 
4
 From a Royal Society letter of Feb 22, 1855, published as Appendix 2 in ‘Report of a Committee 
Appointed to Consider Questions Relating to the Meteorological Department of the Board of Trade,’ 
PP1866 XLV, vii.  
5
 See G. L’E. Turner, ed., The Patronage of Science in the Nineteenth Century, Leyden, 1976; M. 
Boas Hall, All Scientists Now: the Royal Society in the nineteenth century, Cambridge, 1984. 
6
 W. Whewell, History of the Inductive Sciences from the Earliest to the Present Time, 3rd edn, Vol 
1,  London, 1857. 
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limit to accumulations of paper, however well filled, if practical conclusions 
are to be drawn from them as, otherwise, they would overwhelm.7 
 
Fishermen were not wanted to supply the registrations of barometers that were 
issued to them by the Met Department. Neither they nor their barometers were 
meant to contribute to the official project of meteorological statistics. Instead, the 
fishery barometer project relied on the absence of certain registrations. But rather 
than remaining simply irrelevant to the Met Department’s central project of 
fostering a safe and respectable scientific discipline of meteorology, the fishery 
barometers actually helped it. By not registering the weather, I will argue, such 
instruments contributed to scientific administration by helping to create 
autonomous users of its weather forecasts. Designed, constructed, and calibrated in 
the capital, the barometers nonetheless became instruments of local autonomy. How 
and why this happened is the subject of this paper. The argument unfolds in four 
sections. Firstly, I discussed how the barometers were specially designed within the 
Meteorological Department; secondly, I review their distribution to small fishing 
communities where they were carefully sited according to local practices and 
geography. Next, I consider the relationship between FitzRoy’s innovative project 
to provide national weather forecasts and the barometer distribution programme. 
Finally, I suggest some ways in which the advantages of local knowledge were 
further recognized.  
 
Designing a government fishery barometer 
 
The systematic ambitions of the Meteorological Department were part of a broader 
concern in this period with how order could be brought to unruly phenomena, both 
at home in Britain and in the farthest reaches of the British Empire. Colonial 
administrators were acutely concerned to know whether local habits could be 
extrapolated globally and whether any ‘universal’ (or British) order could ever be 
established. The vocabulary of storms was naturally that of governance. Did storms 
obey laws? Tropical colonies produced a simplified arena in which to study the 
matter; tropical storms were both more intense and simpler than those farther 
north.8 Just as tropical territories required different modes of governance from those 
employed domestically, tropical weather laws did not necessarily apply in British 
latitudes. In a popular 1838 treatise titled An Attempt to Develop the Laws of Storms 
by Means of Facts, Arranged According to Place and Time (which was required 
reading in the Navy), William Reid demonstrated that hurricanes and depressions 
rotate in an anti-clockwise direction in the northern hemisphere.9  “The winds are 
so complicated in the latitudes we inhabit,” Reid explained, “that any explanation 
of the causes which lead to their variations, has hitherto been considered hopeless. 
Within the limits of the Equatorial regions, where the winds are nearly uniform, and 
storms seldom occur, the investigation is much simplified, for there a single storm 
may be studied.”10  
 
The continuity of natural laws was a matter of pressing concern to navigators and 
                                                 
7
 FitzRoy to John Street Adelphi, Secretary of National Lifeboat Institution, Jan 14, 1861, PRO BJ 
9/8. 
8
 On India as a laboratory for meteorology, see K. Anderson, Predicting the Weather: Victorians 
and the science of meteorology, Chicago, 2005, 250-264. 
9
 W. Reid, An Attempt to Develop the Law of Storms by Means of Facts, Arranged According to 
Place and Time, London, 1838 ; Lieut.-Colonel Reid, ‘An Attempt to Develope the Law Of Storms,’ 
Times, Oct 4, 1838, 5. 
10 Reid op.cit. (9). 
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sailors. “If portions of the atmosphere within the Tropics, when set in motion by 
expansion, acquire a progressive and rotatory power, and in obedience to a fixed 
law of nature invariably rotate in the same direction, at what distance from the 
Equator do they cease to be subject to that law of nature?” wondered F. P. B 
Martin, in his treatise on equinoctial storms: 
If the diurnal motion of the globe causes the winds to rotate within the tropics, why 
not beyond the tropics? And if this rotatory property of great gales be limited to the 
surface of one portion only of the globe, but universal in its extent, to what precise 
description of gales is it to be considered applicable? If in a heavy gale the wind 
changes in accordance with a certain well established theory, why not in a gale less 
severe? or even in a very strong breeze? or even in one less strong? At what precise 
force in short does wind cease to be subject to this law of nature? If the seaman off 
Bermuda anticipates correctly the force, direction, and duration of the wind for hours 
to come, why not as well when he is off Madeira or the Azores? Why not off New 
York, the Coast of Portugal or Ireland? Why need he run into certain danger in one 
part of the world more than in another?11 
 
Such matters bore directly on the well-being of British sailors and administrators. 
The seaman’s safety depended on the extent to which meteorological phenomena 
could be considered to follow universal laws. “Correct anticipations” of storms 
made off Bermuda might be incorrect off the coast of Ireland. Martin was left with 
the unsatisfactory conclusion that storms were subject to both universal laws and 
local influences. He wrote that “subject to the varying modifications of local 
influences THE LAW OF STORMS is Universal, Semper, ubique, et ab 
omnibus.”12 Sorting out the relative importance of local and universal forms of 
governance was crucial to the safety of sailors at sea. The success of the Met 
Department similarly depended on the proper balance between the formal laws and 
government imposed from Whitehall and local self-government, or the “varying 
modifications of local influences.”  
 
The design of Met Department barometers reflected their varying uses. FitzRoy’s 
first experience with barometers at the Met Department came from his work in 
designing and distributing standard meteorological instruments for Royal Navy and 
merchant marine ships. One of the first tasks to which he turned his attention was 
the design and testing of what would become the standard Kew Marine Barometer. 
Specialized meteorological instruments such as barometers and thermometers were 
supplied to voyages of exploration in the 1830s to take deep-sea measurements.13 
But supplying specialized instruments to customized ships for these one-off 
voyages differed widely from the challenge of transforming every naval ship into a 
piece of a meteorological network. Robust and universally calibrated instruments 
that could be easily incorporated into the normal routines of a merchant or Navy 
ship were needed. Ordinary ship’s barometers, useful to ship captains seeking to 
predict coming weather, were useless to a systematic project because their readings 
                                                 
11 F.P.B. Martin, Memoir on the Equinoctial Storms of March-April 1850; and inquiry into the extent 
to which the rotatory theory may be applied, no publisher or location indicated, 1852,  
 3. 
12 Martin op.cit. (11), 5. Little biographical information is available on Francis Pitney Brouncker 
Martin. He appears to have been born in Madras in 1810 and to have returned to England with his 
wife Julia Augusta in 1845. They took up residence at Kingston House in Dorchester, Dorset, where 
Julia acted as a tutor to the young Thomas Hardy. See 
http://ace.kmc.ac.uk/virtual%20estate/history/TheMartins1845-1853.pdf.  
13
 M. Deacon, Scientists and the Sea, 1650-1900, Aldershot, 1997, 276-305. 
7 
could not be meaningfully compared.14 
 
In 1854, FitzRoy wrote to the Kew Committee of the Royal Society to ask for their 
help in devising standard meteorological instruments for use on board Navy ships. 
Mr Patrick Adie, a well-established London instrument-maker, was invited to 
design a barometer specially suited to marine use.15 At the Kew Observatory, 
Superintendent John Welsh oversaw the testing of Adie’s barometer.16 By June the 
matter had been settled and J. P. Gassiot, head of the Kew Committee, was able to 
write to both the Board of Trade and the Admiralty, recommending the Adie 
barometer at 3 15s. 6d. These barometers consisted of a constricted glass tube 
protected by a tubular brass frame. An iron cistern at the base contained the bulk of 
the mercury and was sealed except for a small aperture open to the air. A small 
graduated scale provided for accurate readings to five-hundredths of an inch. 
Significantly, no weather indications, such as fair or rain, were marked on the scale, 
as FitzRoy hoped to encourage seamen to learn the subtleties of the barometer 
beyond the sometimes misleading rules of thumb. Finally, an air-trap prevented any 
air working its way through the column of mercury into the vacuum above and a 
thermometer affixed to the frame displayed the temperature within the brass case. 
The whole instrument was hung by a brass ring attached to another ring that 
allowed it to swivel freely and remain upright despite the rocking of a ship.17 
 
Less than one year later, one hundred of such Kew marine barometers had been 
issued to Navy ships, and by 1856, 22 sets of Kew-verified instruments had been 
issued to the merchant marine.18   Of the original Parliamentary grants (to the 
Admiralty and the Board of Trade) for the Met Department, the lion’s share of each 
had gone in 1857 towards instrument costs, with the rest on salaries (FitzRoy was 
paid £300 out of each fund) and the payment of port agents (who received 2 10s. 
for each vessel they supplied with approved instruments).19 The full set of 
instruments consisted of a marine barometer, six thermometers, one thermometer 
stand, four glass hydrometers (used for testing) and a compass. The total value of a 
set (which were to be given to Navy ships and could be lent or sold to merchant 
ships) was a not inconsiderable 12l.  6s.  
 
Verifying the instruments took up a lot of John Welsh’s time at Kew. In February, 
                                                 
14
 On barometers, see G. L’E Turner, Nineteenth-Century Scientific Instruments, Chicago, 1983; B. 
Bolle, Barometers, Haarlem, 1978; and N. Goodison, English Barometers, 1680-1860: a history of 
domestic barometers and their makers, London, 1969. On barometers in the 18th century, see also J. 
Golinski, ‘Barometers of Change: meteorological instruments as machines of Enlightenment’ in The 
Sciences in Enlightened Europe (ed. W. Clark, J. Golinksi and S. Schaffer) Chicago, 1999, 69-93; J. 
Golinski, British Weather and the Climate of Enlightenment, Chicago, 2007; and  V. Jankovic, 
Reading the Skies: a cultural history of English weather, 1605-1820, Manchester, 2000, 112. 
15
 Patrick Adie was the son of Alexander Adie, an established Edinburgh scientific instrument maker 
with a special interest in meteorology. Patrick’s brother John joined the father’s business while his 
brother Richard started a business in Liverpool. Alexander and James Adie, Dictionary of National 
Biography. 
16
 In this period, the British Association for the Advancement of Science managed Kew Observatory 
as a centre for electrical, magnetic and meteorological observations. For a history of the site, see 
R.H. Scott, ‘The History of Kew Observatory,’ Proceedings of the Royal Society of London, 39 
(1885) 37-86. 
17
 Bolle, op.cit. (14). 
18 Letters from Welsh to FitzRoy re: testing, supply and dispatch of instruments, Feb 27, 1855, PRO 
BJ 1/13 vii, f 2. By 1868, 212 barometers had been distributed to the Navy, and 488 to the 
mercantile marine. See also P. Skelton, ‘The supply of marine barometers by the Met Office’, 
Marine Observer  (1949), 25, 88-91. 
19 For agents fees, see ‘Report of the Met Department for 1857,’ PP1857 XX, 344. 
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1855 when the big push was on to get instruments onto ships as quickly as possible, 
he complained to FitzRoy that “It may be necessary however that the Kew 
Committee must give me more assistance as I find it rather too much to go through 
all the drudgery of comparison besides superintending all the other business of the 
Observatory. Between work for the B[oard of ] T[rade] and the American 
Government I have since September verified 1500 therms and about 110 
barometers—every reading having been taken by myself.”20 
 
Such careful calibration was needed to make barometers tools for long-term 
scientific research. But aside from the problem of whether the barometers 
themselves could be meaningfully compared, FitzRoy faced a more basic concern. 
As George Airy, the Astronomer Royal, had noted, the distribution of instruments 
to merchant marine ships had the potential to “to give more trouble than everything 
else relating to the observations.” Giving “such fragile instruments” as barometers 
to merchant ship captains would lead to “perpetual heartburning on account of 
broken instruments.” Airy’s solution was to have the ship captains supply their own 
instruments, which would be duly registered and inspected as if they were 
government property: “If the ship-owners supply them, still the instruments must be 
treated as the property of Government: they must be marked with the Government-
mark and with an ordinal number, and must be entered in the Government books, 
and must be examined by the Government officers.”21 The key to responsible 
stewardship, Airy understood, was ownership: thus the problem with expecting 
sailors to care for loaned equipment. On the other hand, for the meteorological 
project to work, privately owned instruments had to be integrated into the network 
of registration and inspection. Airy’s plan was never taken up. John Washington, 
Hydrographer to the Navy, approved of the new Kew standard barometers and 
acknowledged the pitfalls of introducing delicate equipment owned by the new 
government office into naval culture. “We must endeavour to drill our rather fast 
captains into taking more care of them. I think you ought to write to each of those 
who return a broken bar.[ometer] a word of advice if you see no objection.”22 
 
As predicted, FitzRoy was soon fielding correspondence from ship captains 
reporting barometers broken in a variety of situations.23 Captain Sulivan of HMS 
Merlin sparked a lengthy and detailed correspondence between FitzRoy, Adie, and 
Washington, when he wrote with the news that one of the first such barometers 
supplied by Adie had been broken by the “pitching of the ship.”   FitzRoy took such 
a report seriously, the more so since several of the early barometers had already 
turned up broken. “To me it appears that the glass tubes of his earlier lot were not 
well made—the glass was too brittle (In making the glass a certain alloy is used to 
give it toughness)—The Meandarks—Merlin’s— Imperxxx [illeg.] –Eurydice’s and 
Orion’s—all of the first lot—were broken. 6 out of more than a hundred.” 
Washington reminded Captain Sulivan that his claims would influence the whole 
meteorological programme: “As the further use of the Standard Barometer in this 
present form depends upon the reports of those already issued, Capt. Sulivan is 
requested to consider well and enquire whether it is possible that this Barometer 
received a blow or whether it really broke from pitching of the ship.” Adie claimed 
                                                 
20 Letters from Welsh to FitzRoy re: testing, supply and dispatch of instruments, Feb 27, 1855, PRO 
BJ 1/13 vii, f 2. 
21 Airy to Cardwell, Nov 11, 1853, PRO BJ 7/114. 
22 Washington to FitzRoy, Apr 15, 1858, PRO BJ 7/216. 
23 
‘Notes of Admiralty and Board of Trade barometers sent out of and to places in London,’ Jul 
1,1857, PRO BJ 7/370. 
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that it was impossible for the pitching to break the tube unless very “quick and 
short strokes or heavings were given to it, such as I cannot conceive it could get on 
a wave.”24  One year later, FitzRoy noted that roughly 20% of all barometers sent 
from the Board of Trade and the Admiralty were broken in transit.25 
 
When intact, these barometers were intended to furnish observations to be entered 
into the meteorological log carried on ship. Regular registrations of a calibrated 
marine barometer would contribute to the project to uncover universal laws of the 
weather, including laws of storms. Such barometers were undoubtedly also used by 
sailors to foretell the weather, but weather-watching practices were suppressed 
from the project of meteorological statistics and no official mention was made of 
the use of standard Board of Trade barometers as prognosticators. In contrast, when 
FitzRoy turned to the fishery barometer project, the prognostic value of barometers 
was foremost in his mind.  
 
FitzRoy wrote to the instrument makers Negretti & Zambra on Dec 7, 1857 of his 
plan to “place ordinary land barometers as weather glasses solely, at some of the 
more exposed Fishing stations, and coasting harbours, in Great Britain and Ireland,” 
requesting that they visit him with a selection of sturdy, easy to read barometers.26 
Tellingly, he referred interchangeably to barometers and weather-glasses in his 
initial correspondence on the project. By referring to the fishery barometer as a 
weather-glass, FitzRoy was recalling a much older tradition of prognostic weather-
watching. The weather-glass, first mentioned by Francis Bacon in his Sylva 
Sylvarum; or a naturall historie of 1626, was an upright tube filled with water, 
terminating at the top in a bulb containing rarefied air. The water sank or rose in the 
tube as the air in the bulb expanded or contracted. The future that it foretold was 
not the utopian future in which a perfect science of the weather would be 
uncovered. It was the much more ordinary, daily future faced by thousands of 
British fishermen. Justifying the project to his boss, T. H. Farrer, the Assistant 
Secretary of the fast-growing Board of Trade, FitzRoy remarked that he had 
composed the “concise instructions” that would accompany the barometers “always 
remembering that the object of such instructions is, in the first place, the saving of 
valuable lives, on which, but too often, whole families depend . . . the more recent 
works as well as the earlier ones of the best scientific authorities have been 
consulted, in aid of the combined practical experience of those usually considered 
the most ‘weather-wise’.”27 FitzRoy was happy to blend expensive London-made 
instrumentation with homespun weather-glasses, but his correspondents 
consistently demurred from labelling the Board of Trade instruments with the folk 
term and FitzRoy soon restricted himself likewise to talking of barometers. 
 
It mattered to Negretti & Zambra that the barometers FitzRoy was requesting would 
not be required for scientific observation. The accuracy of their scales would be less 
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important, while their legibility and durability would be correspondingly more vital, 
were they to serve the rugged fishermen working the rough coasts of Britain. These 
were barometers made to be seen, rather than recorded. Negretti & Zambra’s 
fishery barometers had clearly visible porcelain scales in a triangular shop window 
display and a few basic instructions for interpreting the rise and fall of the mercury. 
They were proud of their contribution and showed off the instrument in an 1864 
treatise on meteorological instruments.28 FitzRoy also wrote a simple manual of 
instructions intended to explain the basics of the instruments to fishermen.29 
 
Crucial to FitzRoy’s success in securing support for the scheme was limiting what 
might be construed as inappropriate government charity. FitzRoy assured Farrer 
that the programme was intended expressly to aid the poorest and smallest villages, 
which would be loaned the instruments, not given them outright. Even such loans 
would be strictly limited. 
It is understood that no such loan as that of a barometer, costing only four 
pounds (£4) should be made to towns, or large villages on the coast, however 
engaged in sea-faring pursuits their population may be: because such an 
instrument may be readily purchased by subscription if not provided by 
some generous benefactor (as in many places has been done).30 
Towns large enough to raise the funds needed to buy a barometer would not be 
eligible for the loans and private benefactors would be sought whenever possible. 
 
By January 1858, FitzRoy had obtained the permission of Board of Trade President, 
Lord Stanley, for the barometer experiment.31 He turned his attention to Scotland 
first because severe weather conditions there were thought to affect the fishing (in 
particular the herring) industry more than in England.32 Prior to sending barometers 
to coastal towns, FitzRoy elicited some statistical guidance from Bouverie 
Primrose, the Secretary to the Board of Fisheries of Scotland, as to the places that 
“have the largest amount of life and property risked afloat in their vicinity.”33 By 
April, FitzRoy had the Scottish returns from the singularly effective Primrose.34 
They indicated that while some villages already had a barometer (at Eyemouth the 
barometer was “daily noted, and esteemed as a faithful monitor by the Fishermen, 
its warnings having saved them many tempestuous gales”), others strongly desired 
one (in Coldingham the fact that “a number of the fishermen have the common 
weather glasses in their houses which they consider serviceable” was put forward 
“as a proof of the value they would attach to a Barometer were one erected”).35 
FitzRoy anticipated that certain members of the local community might be 
antagonistic: in particular he mentioned “local feelings in respect of the Coast 
Guard, Ministers of Religion or private individuals which in some cases might 
operate inconveniently.”36 Such local figures, FitzRoy feared, might resent the 
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intrusion of new technologies for managing the uncertainty of sea-going, methods 
that might possibly curtail their own authority. The Coast Guard might resent the 
intrusion of the Met Department in their management of coastal traffic, while 
ministers might fear that the prognostic qualities of the barometers would 
undermine religious faith. There is no evidence, however, to suggest that either the 
Coast Guard or ministers felt this way.37  
 
Distributing barometers to fishermen 
 
By June 1858, the specially designed barometers were ready and the surveys 
adequately completed. It was time to distribute the barometers. FitzRoy expressed 
his intention to commence “the experiment of lending a barometer, belonging to the 
Board of Trade, to poor men, (Fishermen and other seafaring persons) whose lives 
are more or less dependent on weather, but who are unable to buy weatherglasses 
by which to be forewarned of impending storms.”38 He sent out the first batch of 
ten Negretti & Zambra fishery barometers to Primrose to be distributed to poor 
fishing villages in Scotland and St. Ives. Favourable weather permitted Primrose to 
deliver the barometers by boat. The response was immediate and positive. At 
Secretary’s Hole, the “fishermen and others mustered on the beach and headed by 
Mr Macintosh, Boat Builder, as Spokesman, warmly expressed their thanks for the 
barometer as it was being landed.” At Rosehearty, the Chief Magistrate expressed 
thanks for the instrument and promised to find a suitable place for it. In Leith, 
twenty-six of the town’s chief fishermen “entered very cordially” into the subject of 
where the barometer should be placed and who should take responsibility for it.39  
 
Stewardship of the instruments was inseparable from their worth. Captain Walker 
reported to Mr Farrer, Secretary of the Board of Trade:  
Within the last few years many lives and much property have been lost on 
the northern and Eastern coasts of Scotland owing to the fishermen 
proceeding to sea when a gale of wind was brewing which they were not 
aware of, but its proximity would have been indicated by a Barometer. These 
valuable instruments lose much of their worth if not placed under the 
management of some person who has some knowledge of their properties 
and who should attend to the range of the mercury and set the index, before 
sending them away we should know who is to have charge of them.40  
Primrose complained to FitzRoy that despite the good weather, “it has been no easy 
matter to get them fitted up and it was impossible to do so at some of the places in 
more than a temporary manner.” Stone houses were erected to protect the 
barometers at some locations. All were arranged so that they were easily visible for 
public examination. Primrose concluded his report by stating that “the people are 
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much pleased and very grateful.”41  
 
Fishermen considered the Met Department instruments to be highly desirable 
additions to their weather-wisdom tool-kit, in addition to reading the skies, 
weather-glasses and almanacks.42 The news of the Scottish ‘barometers for 
fisheries’ programme prompted an influx of requests for barometers from many 
fishing villages in England and Scotland. The fishermen of Beadnell, on the rough 
coast of Northumberland, sent a typical petition via their spokesman, Mr Walker.  
Understanding that public barometers are being placed in the fishing villages in the 
North of Scotland, and that Mr. Stebbing [the optician employed by the Met 
Department] is superintending the setting of and adjustment of these instruments, 
the Fishermen of this village have applied to me to address you on the subject. This 
Coast (the neighbourhood of the Farne Islands), is particularly liable to violent 
gales, which frequently come without any warning + I need hardly remark how 
great a boon such an instrument would be to the Fishermen engaged in the white 
and Herring Fishery here.43 
  
Matters of geography, circulation and responsibility were paramount. The 
inhabitants of Burghead, at the edge of the Moray Firth in Scotland, reminded the 
Met Office that their village was frequented by vessels connected with the foreign 
export trade and that “any improvement that tends to augment its safety, is 
calculated to be a benefit extending to interests beyond those of the mere 
locality.”44 At Bridlington Quay on the Yorkshire coast, a Mr Brambles referred to 
the “exceedingly useful donation of Barometers recently made by your Admirable 
Board” and requested an instrument to protect the “large number of Boatmen daily 
exposing themselves on the sea guided alone, as to the weather, by their own 
uncertain judgment.”45  
 
The petitioners recognized the importance of finding an appropriate location for the 
requested barometers. In their letter requesting a barometer, the fishermen and 
seamen of Burnham characteristically promised to “undertake to place it in a good 
public situation and have every care taken of it.”46 In the east Devon coastal town 
of Budleigh Salterton, 17 men signed a petition (some with a mark rather than a 
signature), requesting “a public Barometer” and suggesting the centrally located 
Coast Guard station as a good place for it.47 And in Berwick, Henry Gates wrote 
that the watch house recently built on the Quay could safely protect and display a 
weather-glass.48 On Plymouth Sound, William Walker eagerly assured FitzRoy that 
he would: 
go over to Cawsand Bay at once and look out for a suitable house where 
Pilots, Fishermen, and Coasters may view the Barometer and take note 
thereof . . . If you can get free access for fishermen to view the Barometers at 
Coast Guard Station houses where such stations houses may be situated on 
the same side of the water as the residence of the Fishermen and others 
interested in the weather. Such station houses would be a better place than in 
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either private or “Public Houses”!!49  
 
Though the dangers of drink in the pub threatened the authority of the barometer, it 
was nonetheless still important to ensure that the barometers were publicly 
accessible, both their purpose and provenance requiring it. As FitzRoy soon 
discovered, even seemingly likely spots had hidden pitfalls. In a letter justifying the 
project to HR Williams, Accountant for the Board of Trade, he explained: 
I once thought the Coast Guard a good means of forwarding this work—so 
did Mr Farrer—but I found, on close inquiry, that the Coast Guard and the 
Fisherman (for whose use the barometers are especially intended)—do not 
associate (for obvious reasons) and that for a fisherman to be seen near a 
Coast-guard house exposes him to the suspicion of being an informer 
(respecting some smuggling affair)—Beside which the Coast Guard 
premises are kept so very clean that Fishermen with dirty boots are not 
welcome—at any time.50 
 
Five days later, Walker had solved the problem, reporting that the fishery barometer 
had been: 
received and put up in the front parlour window of the house of Mr 
Isaac Pearse, a first class branch Pilot, and moreover a well-informed 
man of high character with a scientific turn of mind who volunteered 
to take charge of the instrument leaving it open for consultation by 
everybody. It is a Capital instrument for the purpose, easily read off 
and understood: the Cawsand people are much pleased with the Bd of 
Trade’s liberality.51  
 
This privately controlled, but publicly visible space, superintended by a sailor with 
scientific and voluntaristic leanings, is precisely the sort of space in which a 
‘liberally’-supplied barometer sent from a government office in central London 
could serve as a weather-glass to local fishermen. The physical situation of the 
barometer captured the sense of carefully calibrated control and mediated 
responsibility that the Met Department strove to achieve. The spirit of voluntarism 
evidenced by Isaac Pearse and underlined by Walker testifies to a moral 
responsibility more trustworthy than a mere salary could secure. This was precisely 
the kind of trust that full-time government administrators and scientists struggled to 
establish for themselves. 
 
Mr. Walker gave a vivid account of how such matters were time- as well as space-
sensitive. In a letter written on 12 July 1858, he reported having received FitzRoy’s 
letter on the subject of barometers on 8 July: 
I called a meeting of the men the same evening who at once said they would 
subscribe among them the necessary funds £4 which you say is the price of a 
good barometer. The next day I went by sea with a deputation of the 
Fishermen to procure the cooperation and assistance of their landlord TN 
Craster Esq of Craster Tower in this neighbourhood who agreed to be at the 
expense of making a place of security for it in the wall of one of the houses 
equidistant from the Northern and Southern extremities of the village. Mr 
Craster agrees with me in selecting an old respectable Fisherman of the 
name of Ralph Dixon to be in charge of the instrument, and this selection 
meets also with the approval of the men, who are anxious to have it set up as 
                                                 
49 Barometers for Cawsand Bay, William Walker to FitzRoy, Aug 12, 1858, PRO BJ 7/665. 
50
 FitzRoy to H. R. Williams, Esq., Accountant, Aug 6, 1858, PRO BJ 7/17. 
51 Barometers for Cawsand Bay, Walker to FitzRoy, Aug 17, 1858, PRO BJ 7/665. 
14 
soon as possible, as they are all preparing for the herring fishing—They are 
also anxious to have instructions in the adjustment of the instrument and in 
the use of the scale.52 
 
The instant meeting, the next-day journey to see the local landlord, the 
identification of a central location and respectable caretaker for the instrument 
demonstrate both how urgently the men desired a barometer and their 
understanding of how narrow were the conditions under which such a tool could 
successfully operate. FitzRoy forwarded the Beadnell petition to Mr Bowring, 
registrar at the Board of Trade, noting in a memo that the letter “may be considered 
more or less a type of others likely to follow on the same subject” and asking him 
to “submit to the President my humble opinion that such a barometer (as 
understood to be available) might be sent to Beadnell, in Northumberland, when 
opportunity offers—provided that £4 be paid (to the Accountant of the Board of 
Trade) on its establishment at Beadnell.”53 
 
FitzRoy’s internal memo received grudging approval that did not conceal the 
bureaucratic resistance to what was, in FitzRoy’s own terms, an experiment, an 
uncertain projection of government monies and authority into private, semi-private 
or even public spaces with loyalties to different authorities. Bowring reminded 
FitzRoy that the  
[b]arometers that have been sanctioned are, I understand, in the way of 
experiment only and it is not intended to carry the experiment any further 
until some experience has been had of the advantage expected to result from 
its. In the present case, the parties propose to pay for the Barometer and to 
put it up at their own expense. We might properly I think point out the kind 
of Barometer that Admiral FitzRoy would recommend and inform the parties 
where it is to be got at the price that it is suggested we should charge—But I 
think it would be undesirable that we should furnish the Barometer at a price 
to be paid for to us.54 
 
Bowring’s desire to distance the Board of Trade from the sale of barometers to 
fisheries is an indication of the general distaste for government intervention. His 
awkward grammar is the marker of his complex reasoning: not only should the 
Board of Trade definitely avoid granting barometers to fishermen, but it should 
also avoid the risk to government disinterestedness posed by simply facilitating the 
supply of cut-price barometers. The ‘barometers for fisheries’ programme shows 
how important it was, even in the relatively simple matter of loaning out 
barometers, to draw the line between suggesting an appropriate price for a 
barometer and facilitating the sale of one at that price. Such fine distinctions were 
required to protect the government from the dangers of excessive intervention. 
 
Despite this internally generated difficulty, FitzRoy was successful in supplying 
dozens of coastal villages with barometers. His office responded very quickly to 
requests for barometers (many requests were annotated on the day of receipt with 
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FitzRoy’s efficient “Ack[knowledge]. Barometer to be sent.”), and extant 
correspondence suggests very few instances where requests for barometers were 
rejected. Annual reports from the Met Department listed a steady rise in the number 
of fishery barometers supplied to small fishing communities. Even the encomium to 
loan barometers only to the smallest and poorest towns and to require larger towns 
to raise a subscription themselves seems to have been loosened. In 1858, a request 
for a barometer from the people of Filey in Yorkshire was annotated (by a hand 
other than FitzRoy’s) with a note suggesting that given the size of the village (95 
married and 79 unmarried fishermen) “those interested fishermen should get one at 
their own expense. It would not be more than 1/6 a boat and if the Fishermen would 
not subscribe such a small sum for such a purpose I cannot think they have a claim 
of the Gov’t.”55 (A barometer—it is unclear whether it was loaned or sold—was 
eventually shipped to Filey.) By 1863, in contrast, good-sized towns such as 
Berwick on the Northumberland coast and Devoran in Cornwall were regularly 
loaned the instruments. In his 1863 Met Department report, FitzRoy published a list 
of 89 fishery stations in Britain supplied with barometers, of which 25 were private 
gifts and the rest Board of Trade instruments.56 A steady stream of requests from 
fishing communities continued to arrive at the Department, but from 1861 the 
programme seemed to take care of itself. FitzRoy’s impulse to extend the borders of 
a new office whose remit was somewhat ambiguous (if its central objective of 
meteorological statistics was not) soon settled on what would prove a rather more 
turbulent object. 
 
Weather forecasts as dangerous knowledge 
 
FitzRoy’s forecasting project was informed by several decades worth of storm 
studies that preceded it, but he was emboldened by the Royal Charter storms of late 
October and early November, (named after one of the 343 ships wrecked on British 
coasts by its high winds and seas), to begin his programme of weather forecasting 
based on the rotatory theory of storms.57 FitzRoy used the occasion to test the 
current idea that storms displayed characteristic counter-clockwise rotation in the 
northern hemisphere (and clockwise rotation in the southern). “I was turning round 
two half crowns on a piece of paper (for cyclones) when your packet arrived,” 
FitzRoy wrote to John Washington, Hydrographer to the Navy, “Tomorrow I will 
send a draft for a Circular—(letter not storm).”58 Observations of the Royal Charter 
storm sent to his office from all over Britain had convinced FitzRoy that the 
cyclonic (or rotatory) theory of storms could be used to predict their movements up 
to two days ahead of time.59   
 
FitzRoy soon established a telegraphic system of coastal observers to enable him to 
gather real-time observations and, more radically, to turn the system inside out and 
transmit information back out of London to the coastal stations where it was needed 
most. Begun in February 1861, his initial project to issue storm warnings was 
authorized by the Council of the British Association for the Advancement of 
Science (based on a suggestion first made in Section A (Mathematical and Physical 
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Science) at the 1859 meeting of the BAAS in Aberdeen).60 FitzRoy’s impatience 
may have been related to the system of weather telegraphy recently established by 
Urbain Le Verrier, director of the Imperial Observatory in Paris, by which current 
weather (including any storms) at various points in France and elsewhere in Europe 
were telegraphed to Paris. Such warnings were significantly limited to 
communications of the “actual state of the weather”, not predictions of future 
storms. Le Verrier himself had warned FitzRoy “not to reject what we [the French] 
offer on the pretence that we could do more.”61 But FitzRoy was not content to 
wait. In May 1861, he took the significant step of predicting rather than simply 
reporting poor weather in what he called a weather forecast. He telegraphed his 
coastal observers with forecasts based on their previously telegraphed observations; 
coastal stations with poor forecasts were also sent cautionary notices, advising them 
to raise a series of flags or night lanterns signalling the direction of any dangerous 
winds or gales to nearby ships.62 This innovation was entirely FitzRoy’s, 
unsanctioned by the Board of Trade or the Council of the British Association. 
 
FitzRoy’s daily forecasts were based on a collection of rules and maxims relating to 
the law of rotatory storms that had been confirmed by the Royal Charter storm. 
Telegraphs from coastal observers were received in the Whitehall office daily at 10 
am. FitzRoy drew up the forecasts from west to east, in the order in which the 
weather tended to move. Irish regional forecasts were drawn up first, followed by 
forecasts for the western, central, south-western and south-eastern coasts of Britain. 
Writing these short abstracts took just 30 minutes. FitzRoy also quickly selected, 
from over 200 stations, a list of those places to be immediately telegraphed 
cautionary notices in addition to forecasts. These notices were displayed by raised 
flags in harbours throughout Britain within 30 minutes of receipt. By 11 a.m., 
forecasts had been sent to the Times (for its second edition of the day), Lloyd’s, the 
Shipping Gazette, the Board of Trade, the Admiralty and the Horse Guards, and 
then to other afternoon papers. Later in the day, reports modified by additional 
observations sent in by telegraph in the afternoon were sent out for the next 
morning’s early papers.63 FitzRoy and one other assistant (probably Mr Babington) 
were alone responsible for the forecasts. Fitzroy was proud that few written rules 
were consulted or recorded: “An outline chart, with wind-markers, is useful; 
likewise a transparent horn, or a glass, with circles; but a certain amount of practice 
enables one to dispense with such assistance, and work out the questions mentally 
(like a chess-player who need not look at the board.)”64 
 
Almost as soon as he had begun the forecasts in 1861, FitzRoy came under a great 
deal of pressure. His incorporation of the tools of local weather-watching—rules of 
thumb and individual judgement—with the synoptic technology of telegraphy and a 
central office was highly controversial. Some saw evidence that meteorology had 
finally matured. When the Met Department issued warnings about the gale in which 
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the Whitby lifeboat crew was lost, the Times considered that “the event was 
predicted with as much certainty as an eclipse . . . Meteorology now rests upon 
evidence as palpable as that which confirms our theories of astronomy.”65 Others 
were far less sanguine. Criticism of the forecasts came from a diverse lot: astro-
meteorologists and lunarists who viewed them as competition; Royal Society 
fellows who thought the shaky forecasts were far less accurate than eclipse 
predictions and brought Science in general into disrepute; and Parliament, which 
responded to a suggestion that the weather might be predicted 24 hours in advance 
with laughter.66 By their nature the forecasts were imprecise.67 The Royal Society 
Committee headed by Galton noted disapprovingly what FitzRoy had boasted of: 
that, like a chess-player, he worked out his forecasts mentally. Their report 
concluded that “it is the custom of the Department to perform the whole of the 
foregoing operations, and to determine the forecast, after a simple inspection of the 
list of weather returns [received from coastal observers]. No notes or calculations 
upon paper are made. The operation occupies about half an hour, and is conducted 
mentally.”68 In addition to possibly damaging the scientific status of meteorology, 
they threatened to burden the government with too much responsibility. What if fair 
weather was forecast and ships went to sea only to be beset with an unforeseen 
storm? Equally unacceptable for the commercial vessels was the possibility that 
they might heed a warning of poor weather and stay in harbour, only to find sunny 
skies and money wasted through needless inactivity. Would the government repay 
unearned income? 
 
The Met Department worked hard to make its interventions seem restrained rather 
than forceful so that the fishermen’s judgements could come to the fore. This had 
the dual advantage of curbing the office’s liability for the lives and incomes of 
fishermen and limiting its exposure to ridicule for going too far in prophesying the 
weather. The forecasting controversy was an extremely public demonstration of the 
limits (what some would call the failures) of scientific expertise at a moment when 
the fight for cultural authority was fiercely contested.69 The taint of the fairground 
and the fortune-teller clung to the would-be weather prophet and provided a 
vocabulary for mockery of FitzRoy’s programme. Prediction was a slippery thing; 
it could mark the highest science (astronomy) and the tawdriest sham (palm-
reading).  
 
Kept safely in the appropriate domains, prophesying was not just acceptable but 
desirable. FitzRoy’s forecasting system was not that different from what he 
expected the fishermen to do with their fishery barometers: to make individual 
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judgements based on instrumental readings. The difference, of course, was that 
FitzRoy represented and broadcast the authority of the government along with his 
forecasts, while fishermen were accountable only to themselves. Their methods, 
based on simple rules of thumb and not requiring data-intensive reduction but day-
to-day comparison, were largely similar. Both FitzRoy’s forecasts, and the 
forecasting he was encouraging the fishermen to do on a daily basis, contrasted 
with the slow, long-term and largely unpractical official programme of government 
meteorology. While FitzRoy could have enlisted weather-watchers as contributors 
to the great project in meteorological registration alongside the vast workforce of 
the Royal Navy, he did not. Despite their expense and the high standard of their 
construction, the fishery barometers were not conceived as constituting part of the 
Met Office’s formal programme of gathering comparable meteorological 
observations from sea and coastal observers: they were just weather-glasses. 
Fishermen were not, and should not be made, subject to the same discipline that 
existed in the Royal Navy. 
 
Though the barometers for fisheries programme predated his forecasts, the former 
soon became an important counterbalance to the latter. While fishermen lacked 
certain qualifications, their practice of making daily judgements about going to sea 
and their responsibility for themselves made them ideal participants in FitzRoy’s 
forecasting programme. Their role as voluntary observers operating at a local level 
offered a corrective to the risks of the universal project.  
 
FitzRoy’s barometer project was supplemented by parallel programmes in the 
period situated firmly (and more comfortably) within the British tradition of 
philanthropic and voluntary organizations. In 1859, the Duke of Northumberland 
supplied 14 barometers to poor fishing villages along the Northumberland coast 
between the Tweed and the Tyne.70   In 1860, the National Life-Boat Institution 
announced that it would endeavour to supplement the barometrical philanthropy of 
FitzRoy and the Duke of Northumberland by attempting to supply “every life-boat 
house in the system with a barometer and to train the coxswain how to use it.”71 In 
June 1874, the Marquis of Tweeddale, President of the Scottish Meteorological 
Society, presented twenty sea-thermometers to the society for the use of the 
fishermen for observations of the temperature of the sea, to be taken by them on the 
fishing grounds.72  
 
These projects underlined the links between self-help and safety in the matter of 
weather forecasting. In an article published in The Lifeboat, the journal of the 
National Lifeboat Institution, FitzRoy suggested that the independent judgement of 
the fishermen could act as a corrective to the shortcomings of the forecasts: 
Objection has been taken to such forecasts, because they cannot be always 
correct, for all places in one district. It is, however, considered by most 
persons that general, comprehensive expressions, in aid of local observers, 
who can form independent judgments from the tables and their own 
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instruments, respecting their immediate vicinity, though not so well for 
distant places, may be very useful, as well as interesting; while to an 
unprovided or otherwise uninformed person, an idea of the kind of weather 
thought probable cannot be otherwise than acceptable, provided that he is in 
no way bound to act in accordance with such views, against his own 
judgment. Like the storm signals, such notices should be merely cautionary, 
to denote anticipated disturbance somewhere over these islands, without 
being in the least degree compulsory, or interfering arbitrarily with the 
movements of vessels or individuals.73 
 
Forecasts would not impair the judgement of those who used them, argued FitzRoy; 
they would improve it when used alongside tools such as barometers and weather-
wisdom. British sailors would be free to pursue their livelihoods free from 
excessive government interference. “But, say some, and justly, are ships to remain 
waiting to avoid a gale that, after all, may not happen? Are fisherman and coasters 
to wait idle and miss their opportunities? By no means. All that the cautionary 
signals imply is, ‘Look out.’ ‘Be on your guard.’ ‘Notice your glasses and the signs 
of the weather.’ ‘The atmosphere is much disturbed.’”74 
 
Extending this reasoning, in another Lifeboat article James Glaisher, meteorologist 
at the Royal Observatory in Greenwich, pointed out that both coastal and marine 
barometers could be considered part of the heroic technologies of life-saving:  
I am sure that every assistance will be cheerfully rendered by the National 
Life-Boat Institution to save life—whether by life-boats, ships’ life-boats, 
seamen’s life-belts, fishing life-boats; or, lastly but not least, in its great and 
good work, by helping the sailor on board ship to possess a truthful and 
cheap barometer—a scheme which is indeed only an extension to the sea, of 
the coast barometer system of the Institution; and thus prevent, as far as 
possible, by timely warnings on board ship, the necessity of calling into use 
the last but most glorious assistance—the services of the life-boat itself.75  
Only by combining the barometric readings with their own, individual judgments of 
the weather could lifeboat men successfully forecast the weather. Though it would 
be “folly” to neglect the “cautions given by the barometer,” Glaisher noted the 
“absolute necessity which exists for combining instrumental indications with their 
own local weather estimates, drawn from natural and familiar sources.”76 
 
A questionnaire circulated by the Met Department in 1863 evaluating the utility of 
the fishery barometers confirmed that the instruments sharpened rather than dulled 
the faculties of local fishermen. In Kingsdown, Thomas Sydenham Clarke noted 
that the barometer there was consulted over 500 times a day (“I believe no boat 
goes to sea without the glass being consulted in the first place”) and “forms quite a 
topic of conversation amongst the men, which naturally engenders thought, and 
reflection, and renders barometers and their use more familiar to the men and 
boys.” He added that “the men are very fond of comparing the appearance of the 
clouds, sea, atmosphere, &c., with the glass, and seeing how far their natural 
observation harmonizes with the variations of the glass, and this sharpens their 
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observation and corrects many an idle myth and vulgar notion.”77 
 
The advantage from this increased observational expertise accrued to the local 
fishermen, but FitzRoy benefited indirectly. He was freer to make forecasts because 
he would be less liable for incorrect prognostications if the fishermen were seen to 
be more responsible for themselves. By rendering fishermen more self-reliant, 
FitzRoy could be seen to be making them safer. FitzRoy attempted to make the Met 
Department look like a project characterized by restraint on the part of the 
government and calculated to increase self-reliance on the citizen’s part. In the 
context of Victorian governance, there’s nothing new here. But histories of science 
in Britain in the period (notably histories of electro-technical metrology and 
standardization), have emphasized how the success of such systems depended on 
their ability to reproduce centrally delimited conditions which by definition erased 
or over-wrote local conditions.78 The story of FitzRoy and the barometers provides 
an interesting counterpoint to George Airy’s attempt to introduce sophisticated 
metropolitan instrumentation on board naval and merchant marine ships and to 
establish robust methods for adjusting the compasses on iron-clad ships.79 In 
contrast to what Alison Winter has argued was Airy’s attempt to subdue the 
authority of ship captains, FitzRoy (a retired sea captain himself, after all,) sought a 
way to make the self-sufficiency of the mariner congruent with a successfully 
disciplined scientific network. While Airy was opposed by William Scoresby, who 
waged a popular campaign to limit the intrusions of distant and elite natural 
philosophers into matters that were to remain under local control, FitzRoy faced no 
significant opposition to his project to bring metropolitan instruments to local 
fishermen (though he wondered at one point if he would).  The barometer story is 
an example of how enhancing the individual authority of local actors could help 
sustain centralized liberal governance and generate safety at both the local and the 
government level.  
 
Local knowledge resurgent 
 
Following FitzRoy’s death in 1865, it became clear that the Met Department had 
become dangerously synonymous with FitzRoy himself. The lack of written rules 
made the forecasting system almost unrecoverable without him, despite his 
assistant Babington’s extensive experience. Under a heading titled “This practice 
not carried on according to any definite rules,” the Royal Society Committee 
reported that Babington “does not think that the grounds on which the Department 
acts in foretelling weather are capable of being stated in the form of Rules or 
Laws.” All of the knowledge of government forecasting existed solely in the heads 
of a few government employees. “Were the gentlemen now in the Department to 
leave it, no rules would be found in the Office for continuing the duties on their 
present basis.”80 The Committee recommended that the storm warnings continue 
but that forecasts be suspended from May 28, 1866. The barometer programme 
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continued. Management of the newly renamed Met Office succeeded to a 
meteorological committee of the Royal Society (largely made up of members of its 
Kew Committee).81  
 
R. H. Scott, translator of Dove’s The Law of Storms in 1862, was appointed head of 
the reorganized Office, a post he held for thirty-three years under the watchful eyes 
and increased authority of a Meteorological Committee of the Royal Society. Scott 
immediately began reformulating the Office’s purpose along lines more acceptable 
to the Committee. In a letter to Farrer, Scott assured him that “though they [the Met 
Office] distinctly decline to prognosticate weather, or to transmit what have been 
called ‘storm warnings’, they are collecting information which they confidently 
anticipate will enable them, sooner or later, to frame rules by which such 
prognostications can be made; and that one of the main objects which they propose 
to themselves is the advancement of meteorological science in this important 
practical direction.”82 
 
The debate over the utility of barometers in relation to weather forecasts continued. 
In 1876, the Meteorological Committee was charged by the Treasury with 
reviewing the “results obtained” from the by then considerable annual grant from 
Parliament of £10,000. The committee pondered whether the signals and forecasts 
should be reinstated. They heard evidence collected by W. F. Pilter, Superintendent 
of the Mercantile Marine in Shields, from local men involved in the fishing trade on 
the question of whether the still-suspended forecasts had been considered helpful or 
dangerous. Herring, a deep-sea fish that lurks in deep waters, drew the fishermen in 
its pursuit out to sea in perilous open boats. As a consequence, the herring 
fishermen of Shields “never disregard [storm] signals,” reported Pilter. Salmon, on 
the other hand, stayed closer to shore and correspondingly so did its fishermen: “the 
distances they go is so short they can always run into harbour.” Salmon-fishermen, 
it seemed, paid consequently little attention to the forecasts. Because sailing-ship 
masters could not count on out-running an impending gale, they “generally 
speaking, detain their vessels and put confidence in the signals.” But steamboat 
masters could count on getting “clear of the district in which the gale is expected 
before it breaks.” Despite “believing a gale will almost certainly follow the hoisting 
of a signal, [they] do not as a rule detain their vessels, if it is fair weather at the 
time.” For steam tug owners, any delay caused by storm warnings was money lost: 
“It is to their advantage to tow a vessel to sea as soon as she is ready. Detention 
keeps them idle … Their interest in the vessel ceases as soon as they have taken her 
safely over the bar. Witnesses, to prove the utter uselessness of the signals, can be 
easily obtained from this class of men.” They “heartily wish they [storm signals] 
were abolished.” Pilter’s letter concluded with the assertion that, despite the variety 
of attitudes towards storm signals, “the general feeling amongst the maritime 
community is in favour of a continuation of the signals.”83 
 
Henry Lindsay, collector of the Custom House in Shields, also shared his views on 
storm signals. He began by noting that the warnings were not as useful on the east 
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coast as they were on the west, since the falling barometer on which they were 
based usually indicated a strong off-shore wind that became fair for most boats 
leaving Tyne. He did acknowledge, however that “when first hoisted in the Tyne, 
their novelty, and the new science they evidenced caused them to be carefully 
observed, and I am aware that they did, in many instances, deter masters from 
putting to sea.” But simple deterrence was not in itself proof of the utility of storm 
signals. Fishermen, sailing-ship masters and steam tug owners alike made their 
living from the sea and staying in port in fine weather was bad business. If working 
sailors simply took the forecasts at face value, they would quickly find themselves 
overly dependent on a dangerous form of universalized knowledge that did not, for 
example, take into account the different meanings of falling barometric pressure on 
the east and west coasts of England. Such forecasts could easily let them down.84  
 
Rather than rendering the ship captains more reliant on information from without, 
however, Lindsay suggested the forecasts made them more self-reliant. “Masters of 
vessels,” he wrote, “who had in this temperate zone paid little attention to the 
indications of the barometer, content to be weather-wise from their observations of 
atmospheric or other natural phenomena, began first to study their instruments for 
evidence of the forecasts as signified by the signals, and then to rely greatly on their 
own capacity to judge of the coming weather. They practically, therefore, depend 
very much on themselves.” Rather than robbing autocratic captains of their personal 
authority, according to Lindsay, the introduction of storm signals spurred them into 
a reappraisal of their own skills, a kind of continuing education in which the 
captains tested their capacity to “judge of the coming weather” against that of the 
government meteorologists responsible for storm warnings. The implication was 
two-fold: ship captains who relied on themselves were better off than either those 
captains who took storm signals literally or those who disregarded them 
completely; and storm signals would have the effect of stimulating the captains into 
fuller self-reliance.85 
 
Pilter and Lindsay’s emphasis on locally differentiated responses to storm warnings 
was largely ignored by a Committee concerned with the bigger question of whether 
meteorology should be pursued by a government body at all, and, if so, in what 
form. Storm signals were central to the on-going identity crisis suffered by the 
government meteorological office in the twenty years since its founding. The 
debate over forecasting and prediction in which they figured tended to be polarized 
in the following terms: practical, local and empirical weather-wisdom was 
contrasted with scientific, universal and theoretical meteorology. Scott worked hard 
to distinguish warnings about existing weather from forecasts relating to future 
storms. Warnings could be safely incorporated with local readings and tools: 
It seems to me . . . that this office may without attempting to forecast 
weather, place outstations in possession of such meteorological information 
as it may have received on any day. It must be clearly understood that any 
telegraphic message of a warning nature is merely meant to imply that there 
is a storm existing along a certain region of coast, say the S.W., and 
consequently that there is or may be danger impending at other districts. 
Accordingly vessels bound southwards will know what they have to expect, 
but the crews of local craft, such as fishermen, must be guided as to the 
immediate risk which they incur by their own observations of the look of the 
sky, etc, and also by the behaviour of the local instruments, such as fishery 
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barometers with which the coast has been so liberally supplied by the 
Government.86 
 
Initially thought to be reducible to instrumental traces, local knowledge proved to 
be both more intractable and more valuable. The Met Committee included a section 
on “local signs” in their ten-year report on the progress of the Office since 
FitzRoy’s death: 
These are really among the most important indications of coming change; 
but practically they can scarcely be utilized by us. They cannot be reduced to 
rule, and they depend almost entirely on personal experience. It is impossible 
in a telegram to convey the entire line of reasoning which leads one, in the 
absence of instruments, to know that a storm is impending. The character, 
elevation, and motion of clouds, the colour of the sky, the clearness or the 
contrary of the air, the appearance of the aurora, and numerous other signs 
are well known to every one who studies the weather; and from these helps 
the cabinet meteorologist is entirely debarred. He is like a physician dealing 
with a case by correspondence, without the chance of a personal interview 
with his patient; for what can a resident in an inland town like London, on 
any given day, know of the look of the weather on the sea-coast on the same 
day.87  
  
This appreciation of local signs grew, by the 1870s and 1880s, to include an interest 
in indigenous customs and traditions. While Victorian fishermen left few traces of 
their own (in contrast to the hundreds of thousands of ships’ logbooks that remain 
from the period), their habits were increasingly considered worthy of registration by 
a growing English folklore movement.88 While inspecting coastal barometer 
stations in 1883 for the Scottish Meteorological Society, H. N. Dickson met with 
fishermen to teach them the law of storms and how to use the barometers. “The 
method followed in conducting these meetings was to suggest generalizations on 
facts already known to the men; and it thus became necessary to ascertain, in each 
case, what facts were to them most important in forming opinions about probable 
weather.”89 Registering this kind of information was not easy. Dickson struggled to 
elicit “definite information” that he could include in his report. “The cloud 
observations made by fishermen are of great interest, but there is considerable 
difficulty in getting accurate descriptions of them—the men know the weather by 
the ‘look of the heavens,’ but it is not easy to get them to explain how.”90 A 
tantalizing doggerel verse on tides was incomplete:  
When the loon begins to cry 
Anchors and cables you stand by, 
.  .  .  .  .  .  
Never trust the second flood. 
(Third line had been forgotten and could not be recovered.)91 
 
Some things completely defied the will to record them. Of a prognostic believed to 
                                                 
86
 ‘Report of the Meteorological Committee of the Royal Society for 1867,’ PP1867-68 LXIII, 297. 
87
 ‘Report of the Meteorological Committee to the President and Council of the Royal Society on the 
work done in the Meteorological Office since their appointment in 1866 to December 31, 1875’ 
PP877 XXXIII, 139. 
88
 R. Dorson, ‘The great team of English folklorists’, The Journal of American Folklore (1951), 64, 
1-10; W. Gregor, ‘Some folk-lore of the sea’, Folk-lore Journal (1885), 3, 52-56.. 
89
 H. Dickson, ‘Weather folk-lore of Scottish fishermen’, Journal of the Scottish Meteorological 
Society 3rd series  (1889), 8, 349-355. 
349-350. 
90
 Dickson, op.cit. (89), 351. 
91
 Dickson, op.cit. (89), 353. 
24 
have been common in the villages between Aberdeen and Stonehaven—by which 
the severity of the early months of the year could be foretold by the state of the 
upper clouds during the previous November and December—Dickson was 
“unfortunately unable to find any trace.”92 
 
Conclusion 
 
Two distinct but related historiographies relate to this early episode in government 
meteorology, both of which bear on the question of how safety was generated in the 
period. One is the literature that treats the broad question of the ‘revolution in 
government’ from the perspective of self-evident ‘social evils’ such as accidents 
and epidemics. The other is that on the growth of science in the period, which 
includes a small but significant sub-literature on government science and 
government funding for science.93 From different angles, both attempt to explain 
the increase in certain kinds of government intervention (or funding) into public 
health and safety in this period but they produce strikingly different descriptions of 
the actions of government, to say nothing of their different explanations for such 
actions. In the literature on the revolution in government, spearheaded by Oliver 
MacDonagh, government is described as responding in an ad hoc manner to an 
outraged public.94 Government response is seen as ad hoc because of the contingent 
nature of the provocations: a combination of appalling disasters, the cumulative 
horror of poor living and working conditions, and a number of highly effective 
reformers. In the sub-literature on government science and government funding for 
science literature, the arrow generally points outward from government to projects 
such as the Parliamentary Committees (of which the Devonshire Commission is a 
prime example) and the Challenger expedition of 1872-1876. Within this 
historiography, the rise of the expert has often been plotted as a teleological 
phenomenon in which the scientist fights for and eventually gains his due authority. 
The flip side of the growing power of the expert in this literature is the decreasing 
importance of inexpert, local, or artisanal knowledge. When and where scientists in 
the period are seen to fail (as they are quite frequently), such histories identify a 
lack of system or control rather than a successful negotiation between alternate 
forms of authority. The power of the expert in this historiography is understood to 
directly relate to his ability to quell alternate forms of knowledge while 
simultaneously training those who would participate in a network of 
communication or apprenticeship.  
 
There is a subtle but important irony to these criss-crossing historiographic vectors. 
According to the literature on government science, endowments for science—
provisional, piecemeal and self-consciously ‘exceptional’ though they may have 
been in this period—originated within government, and were enacted by a cadre of 
government experts with increasing authority.95 Within the historiography of a 
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‘revolution in government’, on the other hand, the enduring emblems of social 
control such as the Factory and Railway Inspectorates are considered to be subject 
to a fluctuating tide of public opinion and outrage. Combining these 
historiographies produces an odd beast: a steady but relatively passive response by 
the government to social evils and an erratic but more active government approach 
to science.  
 
In the historiography of the ‘revolution in government’, the distribution of 
barometers to fishermen would therefore be interpreted as a result of public angst 
over a rising tide of shipwrecks involving poor fishermen. In the literature on 
government science, on the other hand, it would be understood as a move to 
increase the authority of a science by establishing a system of disciplined users of 
scientific instruments. This divergence only disappears when the distinction 
between applications to address public health (broadly conceived to include 
shipwreck and railway accident alongside cholera and overcrowding) and scientific 
projects is made to disappear. At the early Met Department, government 
meteorologists attempted to impose centralized control on something that only 
existed as a collection of data points: a kind of weather that could never be 
experienced anywhere but in FitzRoy’s office. Yet the justification for this type of 
science as government science was always based at least partially on its practical 
utility to British fishermen, sailors and farmers who expressly did not contribute to 
centralized registration systems.   
 
FitzRoy’s ability to gather support for the unauthorized project underscores the 
ambiguity of purpose that characterized the early Met Department. Funded by both 
the Board of Trade and the Admiralty, administered by a naval man but counselled 
by the Royal Society, the office expressed the ambivalent desire both to link the 
scientific to the practical (for funding purposes) and to distinguish them (lest 
science become too tainted by the practical). In giving barometers to fisheries, 
FitzRoy was attending to the practical matter of their immediate safety. The 
fishermen responded with alacrity, eager for any tool that might protect them from 
the dangers of the sea. FitzRoy’s background as a naval captain helps explain his 
desire to materially improve the lives of fishermen while the statistical project ran 
its course. But his other big unofficial practical project—his establishment first of 
telegraphed storm warnings indicating the movements of already observed storms, 
and eventually, of weather forecasts predicting future storms not yet observed—
soon brought the new Department under heavy scrutiny.  
 
Weather forecasts could be dangerous to the government because they might lead to 
an erosion of individual responsibility and a misplaced assumption of government 
control. This potentially dangerous loss of local control as a result of increasing 
government regulation and intervention only made it clearer how essential common 
judgements remained. Such judgements inoculated the centralized administration 
from responsibility for a range of local decisions and, potentially, accidents. The 
barometer project served to promote the autonomy and responsibility of individual 
fishermen who might also be users of FitzRoy’s forecasts. In providing instruments 
to fishermen, the government office elicited a specific kind of resistance to its own 
authority that rendered it more, rather than less viable, and more, rather than less 
safe. These different forms of authority were in fact symbiotic. The synoptic vision 
of government meteorology depended on the autonomous judgement of various 
citizens. By protecting the government scientists from their worst possible 
mistakes, the judgement of the individual fishermen allowed the government 
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science project to continue.  
 
By revealing the potential for an instrument to be useful when not generating 
inscriptions, this episode also suggests a broader role for elite instrumentation than 
has previously been recognized. This mechanically-aided form of individual 
judgment was necessary and possible only within the framework of a new 
government office, which sought to govern something that had previously been 
ungovernable—the weather—while allowing British individuals to continue to 
govern themselves. The new government Met Office proposed simultaneously to 
reorganize existing materials and budgets while generating a new kind of 
knowledge and, by extension, a new kind of British safety. This new safety was 
born of knowledge of the weather that could only be generated in the central office 
where FitzRoy gathered telegraphic dispatches from coastal observers but that 
could only be put to use in a responsible fashion at the edges of the telegraphic 
network, and, beyond, at the edges of the British nation. The barometers for 
fisheries project therefore discloses a substantial and mutually beneficial 
entanglement between a scientific government office and a set of mostly illiterate 
and impoverished fishermen. It provides a different view of government science 
from the usual historiographic tropes of professionalisation and administrative 
excrescence. Here instead is a story about a project that was more or less without 
cost to the government, and that was driven not by the increasing authority of 
scientific experts but by a desire to harness the personal authority of the British 
mariner. 
 
 Meteorology at the moment of its institutional origins and that of the larger 
‘revolution in government’ should be understood in terms of a dialectic between 
loss of control and self-reliance that characterized the period more generally. Like 
other new government interventions into public health, the Met Department was 
perceived with high scepticism by many who believed that, at best, any extension 
of government set an undesirable precedent of ill-founded charity and, at worst, 
dangerous intrusion. At risk was the self-sufficiency upon which the nation’s 
commercial and imperial advances were based. By keeping fishermen outside the 
registration regime, FitzRoy saved them as icons of British independence and self-
help. By making them better watchers of the weather, the Met Department 
barometers in fact helped to make them safer users of the uncertain forecasts. A 
well-informed fisherman accustomed to using a complete set of weather watching 
tools, which included reading the skies and consulting a public barometer as well as 
taking note of Met Department forecasts, would be less likely to hold the 
government liable for the repercussions of any incorrect forecasts. But while the 
tacit knowledge and individualized judgements of fishermen helped make the 
barometer programme a success, FitzRoy’s attempt to keep his forecasting methods 
largely in his own head was deeply suspicious to the Meteorological Committee of 
the Royal Society.  
 
This paper has demonstrated one set of relations between formal and tacit 
knowledge in the context of a new government department. Rather than finding 
opposition between the two forms of knowledge, it recounts a history in which a 
useful symbiosis between the two was knowingly constructed by contemporary 
actors even as a explicit commitment to formal knowledge was maintained. The 
Met Department would only achieve its full goal of contributing to the safety of 
sailors at sea (via an increased understanding of the laws of the weather) by careful 
measurement and registration of the weather. In the meantime, however, it was just 
27 
as important the fishermen be encouraged to develop their own ability to read that 
weather. This story of balancing local knowledge against centralized knowledge 
demonstrates that both instruments and institutions can promote autonomy as well 
as discipline in the name of public safety.  
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